JUE Insight: How much does COVID-19 increase with mobility? Evidence from New York and four other U.S. cities.

How effective are restrictions on mobility in limiting COVID-19 spread? Using zip code data across five U.S. cities, we estimate that total cases per capita decrease by 19% for every ten percentage point fall in mobility. Addressing endogeneity concerns, we instrument for travel by residential teleworkable and essential shares and find a 25% decline in cases per capita. Using panel data for NYC with week and zip code fixed effects, we estimate a decline of 30%. We find substantial spatial and temporal heterogeneity; east coast cities have stronger effects, with the largest for NYC in the pandemic's early stages.

Reflections on the post-Covid city

What will COVID-19 and the shift to remote work do to the cities of the world? The temporary disruptions have been enormous and remain enormous as of the late summer of 2022. Offices remain vacant in many large cities. Within the US, the pandemic sped up the longer-term movement of people and firms to the sunbelt. Looking forward, there seem to be two possible scenarios, depending on the pandemic events of the future. If COVID-19 is only the first of a wave of deadly global disease events, then the urban renaissance that began thirty years ago could end. If COVID-19 is a one-off pandemic, then the impact of disease and telecommuting on urban life will be more limited. The enduring demand of people to enjoy urban amenities, and the value of learning face-to-face should enable cities to survive this shock. The stark gap between these two scenarios highlights the importance of global investments in public health that can reduce the risk of future pandemics.

DETERMINANTS OF SMALL BUSINESS REOPENING DECISIONS AFTER COVID RESTRICTIONS WERE LIFTED

The COVID-19 pandemic led to dramatic economic disruptions, including government-imposed restrictions that temporarily shuttered millions of American businesses. We use a nationwide survey of thousands of small business owners to establish three main facts about business owners? decisions to reopen at the end of the lockdowns. First, roughly 60 percent of firms planned to reopen within days of the end of legal restrictions, suggesting that the lockdowns were generally binding for businesses?although nearly 30 percent expected to delay their reopening by at least a month. Second, decisions to delay reopenings did not seem to be driven by concerns about employee or customer health;even businesses in high-proximity sectors with the highest health risks generally reported intentions to reopen as soon as regulations allowed. Third, pessimistic demand projections primarily explain delays among firms that could legally reopen. Owners expected demand to be one-third lower than before the crisis throughout the pandemic. Using experimentally induced shocks to perceived demand, we find that a 10 percent decline in expected demand results in a 1.5 percentage point (8 percent) increase in the likelihood that firms expected to remain closed for at least one month after being legally able to open. We use follow-up surveys to cross-validate expectations with realized outcomes. Overall, our results suggest that governments set more stringent guidelines for reopening than what many businesses would have selected, suggesting that governments may have internalized costs of contagion that businesses did not.

Urban resilience

Will COVID-19 end the urban renaissance that many cities have experienced since the 1980s? This essay selectively reviews the copious literature that now exists on the long-term impact of natural disasters. At this point, the long-run resilience of cities to many forms of physical destruction, including bombing, earthquakes and fires, has been well-documented. The destruction of human capital may leave a longer imprint, but cities have persisted through many plagues over the past millennia. By contrast, economic and political shocks, including deindustrialisation or the loss of capital city status, can enormously harm an urban area. These facts suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic will only significantly alter urban fortunes if it is accompanied by a major economic shift, such as widespread adoption of remote work, or political shifts that could lead businesses and the wealthy to leave urban areas. The combination of an increased ability to relocate with increased local redistribution or deterioration of local amenity levels, or both, could recreate some of the key attributes of the urban crisis of the 1970s. (English) [ FROM AUTHOR] 新冠疫情会结束许多城市自 80 年代以来经历的城市复兴吗？本文选择性回顾了关于自然灾害长期影响的大量现有文献。目前，城市面对多种形式的物理破坏（包括爆炸、地震和火灾）的长期复原力已得到充分证明。人力资本的破坏可能会留下更长的印记，但在过去的几千年里，城市经历过许多瘟疫。相比之下，经济和政治冲击（包括去工业化或首都地位的丧失）会对城市地区造成巨大伤害。这些事实表明，只有伴随着重大的经济转变（例如远程工作的广泛采用）或可能导致企业和富人离开城市地区的政治转变，新冠疫情才会显著改变城市的命运。重新安置能力的提高与当地重新分配的增加或当地舒适度水平恶化（或两者兼而有之）相结合，可能会导致 1970 年代城市危机的一些关键特征复现。 (Chinese) [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Urban Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.) is the property of Sage Publications, Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

Urban resilience

Will COVID-19 end the urban renaissance that many cities have experienced since the 1980s? This essay selectively reviews the copious literature that now exists on the long-term impact of natural disasters. At this point, the long-run resilience of cities to many forms of physical destruction, including bombing, earthquakes and fires, has been well-documented. The destruction of human capital may leave a longer imprint, but cities have persisted through many plagues over the past millennia. By contrast, economic and political shocks, including deindustrialisation or the loss of capital city status, can enormously harm an urban area. These facts suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic will only significantly alter urban fortunes if it is accompanied by a major economic shift, such as widespread adoption of remote work, or political shifts that could lead businesses and the wealthy to leave urban areas. The combination of an increased ability to relocate with increased local redistribution or deterioration of local amenity levels, or both, could recreate some of the key attributes of the urban crisis of the 1970s.

When Innovation Goes Wrong: Technological Regress and the Opioid Epidemic

The fourfold increase in opioid deaths between 2000 and 2017 rivals even the COVID-19 pandemic as a health crisis for America. Why did it happen? Measures of demand for pain relief – physical pain and despair – are high and in many cases rising, but their increase was nowhere near as large as the increase in deaths. The primary shift is in supply, primarily of new forms of allegedly safer narcotics. These new pain relievers flowed in greater volume to areas with more physical pain and mental health impairment, but since their apparent safety was an illusion, opioid deaths followed. By the end of the 2000s, restrictions on legal opioids led to further supply-side innovations which created the burgeoning illegal market that accounts for the bulk of opioid deaths today. Because opioid use is easier to start than end, America’s opioid epidemic is likely to persist for some time.

What Jobs are Being Done at Home During the Covid-19 Crisis? Evidence from Firm-Level Surveys

The threat of COVID-19 has increased the health risks of going to an office or factory, leading more workers to do their jobs remotely. In this paper, we provide results from firm surveys on both small and large businesses on the prevalence and productivity of remote work, and expectations about the persistence of remote work once the COVID-19 crisis ends. We present four main findings. First, while overall levels of remote work are high, there is considerable variation across industries. The Dingel and Neiman (2020) measure of suitability for remote work does a remarkably good job of predicting the industry level patterns of remote work - highlighting the challenge of moving many industries to remote work. Second, remote work is much more common in industries with better educated and better paid workers. Third, in our larger survey, employers think that there has been less productivity loss from remote working in better educated and higher paid industries. Fourth, more than one-third of firms that had employees switch to remote work believe that remote work will remain more common at their company even after the COVID-19 crisis ends.

Urban Resilience

Will COVID-19 end the urban renaissance that many cities have experienced since the 1980s? This essay selectively reviews the copious literature that now exists on the long-term impact of natural disasters. At this point, the long-run resilience of cities to many forms of physical destruction, including bombing, earthquakes and fires, has been well-documented. The destruction of human capital may leave a longer imprint, but cities have persisted through many plagues over the past millennia. By contrast, economic and political shocks, including deindustrialization or the loss of capital city status, can enormously harm an urban area. These facts suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic will only significantly alter urban fortunes, if it is accompanied by a major economic shift, such as widespread adoption of remote work, or political shifts that could lead businesses and the wealthy to leave urban areas. The combination of an increased ability to relocate with increased local redistribution or deterioration of local amenity levels or both could recreate some of the key attributes of the urban crisis of the 1970s.

Learning from Deregulation: The Asymmetric Impact of Lockdown and Reopening on Risky Behavior During COVID-19

During the COVID-19 pandemic, states issued and then rescinded stay-at-home orders that restricted mobility. We develop a model of learning by deregulation, which predicts that lifting stay-at-home orders can signal that going out has become safer. Using restaurant activity data, we find that the implementation of stay-at-home orders initially had a limited impact, but that activity rose quickly after states’ reopenings. The results suggest that consumers inferred from reopening that it was safer to eat out. The rational, but mistaken inference that occurs in our model may explain why a sharp rise of COVID-19 cases followed reopening in some states.

How Much does COVID-19 Increase with Mobility? Evidence from New York and Four Other U.S. Cities

How effective are restrictions on mobility in limiting COVID-19 spread? Using zip code data across five U.S. cities, we estimate that total cases per capita decrease by 20% for every ten percentage point fall in mobility. Addressing endogeneity concerns, we instrument for travel by residential teleworkable and essential shares and find a 27% decline in cases per capita. Using panel data for NYC with week and zip code fixed effects, we estimate a decline of 17%. We find substantial spatial and temporal heterogeneity;east coast cities have stronger effects, with the largest for NYC in the pandemic’s early stages.

How Are Small Businesses Adjusting to COVID-19? Early Evidence from a Survey

In addition to its impact on public health, COVID-19 has had a major impact on the economy. To shed light on how COVID-19 is affecting small businesses – and on the likely impact of the recent stimulus bill, we conducted a survey of more than 5,800 small businesses. Several main themes emerge from the results. First, mass layoffs and closures have already occurred. In our sample, 43 percent of businesses are temporarily closed, and businesses have – on average – reduced their employee counts by 40 percent relative to January. Second, consistent with previous literature, we find that many small businesses are financially fragile. For example, the median business has more than $10,000 in monthly expenses and less than one month of cash on hand. Third, businesses have widely varying beliefs about the likely duration of COVID related disruptions. Fourth, the majority of businesses planned to seek funding through the CARES act. However, many anticipated problems with accessing the aid, such as bureaucratic hassles and difficulties establishing eligibility.

Economic Analysis and Infrastructure Investment

This paper summarizes economic research on investment in public infrastructure and introduces the findings of several new studies on this topic. It begins with a review of several potential justifications for the public sector’s involvement in building, financing, and operating infrastructure, including limitations of private capital markets, externalities, and the control of natural monopolies. It then describes the conditions that characterize an optimal infrastructure investment program, emphasizing the need to extend project-based microeconomic cost-benefit analysis to incorporate the value of economy-wide macroeconomic and other externalities. It notes the importance of efficient use of infrastructure capital, and discusses three areas -- procurement, project management, and expenditure on externality mitigation – where further research could identify paths to efficiency improvement. It concludes by identifying several trends that have emerged since outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic that may have long-term effects on the role of both physical and digital infrastructure in the U.S. economy.

Determinants of Small Business Reopening Decisions After COVID Restrictions Were Lifted

The COVID-19 pandemic led to dramatic economic disruptions, including government-imposed restrictions that required millions of American businesses to temporarily close. We present three main facts about business decisions to reopen at the end of the lockdown, using a nation-wide survey of thousands of small businesses. First, the plurality of firms reopened within days of the end of legal restrictions, suggesting that the lockdowns were generally binding for businesses - although a sizable minority delayed their reopening. Second, decisions to delay reopenings were not driven by public health concerns. Instead, businesses in high-proximity sectors planned to reopen more slowly because of expectations of stricter regulation rather than concerns about public health. Third, pessimistic demand projections played the primary role in explaining delays among firms that could legally reopen. Owners expected demand to be one-third lower than before the crisis throughout the pandemic. Using experimentally induced shocks to perceived demand, we find that a 10% decline in expected demand results in a 1.5 percentage point (8%) increase in the likelihood that firms expected to remain closed for at least one month after being legally able to open.

Learning from deregulation: The asymmetric impact of lockdown and reopening on risky behavior during COVID-19.

During the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, states issued and then rescinded stay-at-home orders that restricted mobility. We develop a model of learning by deregulation, which predicts that lifting stay-at-home orders can signal that going out has become safer. Using restaurant activity data, we find that the implementation of stay-at-home orders initially had a limited impact, but that activity rose quickly after states' reopenings. The results suggest that consumers inferred from reopening that it was safer to eat out. The rational, but mistaken inference that occurs in our model may explain why a sharp rise of COVID-19 cases followed reopening in some states.

The impact of COVID-19 on small business outcomes and expectations.

To explore the impact of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) on small businesses, we conducted a survey of more than 5,800 small businesses between March 28 and April 4, 2020. Several themes emerged. First, mass layoffs and closures had already occurred-just a few weeks into the crisis. Second, the risk of closure was negatively associated with the expected length of the crisis. Moreover, businesses had widely varying beliefs about the likely duration of COVID-related disruptions. Third, many small businesses are financially fragile: The median business with more than $10,000 in monthly expenses had only about 2 wk of cash on hand at the time of the survey. Fourth, the majority of businesses planned to seek funding through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. However, many anticipated problems with accessing the program, such as bureaucratic hassles and difficulties establishing eligibility. Using experimental variation, we also assess take-up rates and business resilience effects for loans relative to grants-based programs.